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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------DEBRA LYNN MARTINEAU,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
PETITION FOR REHEARING

vs.
ELLIOT J. ANDERSON and
MARY CHRISTINE ANDERSON,

No. 16923

Defendants and
Respondents.

--------------------------------------This Court has established the rule that for a
rehearing to be granted it is necessary for the petitioning
party to show that the Court has misconstrued material
facts, overlooked statutes or decisions which might affect
the result, based the decision on wrong principles of law,
or misapplied or overlooked something which materially
affects the result.

Cummings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157,

129 Pac. 619 (1919).
Appellant believes that this criteria is met in
this case since the majority opinion has created a serious
inconsistency between the obligations of counsel and a
trial court in the supervision and control of a verdict.
In the majority opinion it is stated that plaintiff's

•

counsel waived the clearly erroneous form of the verdict
since counsel did not request to see the verdict form and
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consequently did not object to its inconsistency until
after the jury had been excused.

(Slip opinion, p. 5).

The majority opinion quoted the Langton and Cohn cases in
support of the proposition and concluded that "counsel
has the obligation not only to object to the form of the
verdict but to affirmatively seek to examine it."
As a practical matter, the majority opinion has placed
the entire burden of supervising a jury verdict upon
counsel and has eliminated all burden upon the trial court.
Under the majority's ruling once a verdict is rendered,
counsel for the parties must demand to see it from the
court or run the risk of waiving undisclosed defects.

The

court must show it to counsel in order to avoid the claim
that counsel was not afforded opportunity to object.

Counsel

then must decide whether to request the jury verdict to be
resubmitted to the court or to allow it to be entered.
The trial court, under the majority's ruling, has no discretion or choice but to allow the counsel to take complete
control as to what should occur with the verdict form.
In the instant case, for example, the lower court
incorrectly resubmitted the matter to the jury without
counsel's specific request to do so since only counsel,
under the majority opinion, has the responsibility to correct
errors and request resubmission.
Obviously, this scenario is inconsistent with
Rule 47(r), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which states:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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If the verdict rendered is informal
or insufficient, it may be corrected
by the jury under the advice of the
court, or the jury may be sent out
again.
In addition, §78-7-5, U.C.A., provides that every
court has the power:
(5) to control in furtherance of justice
the conduct of its ministerial officers,
and all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceeding before
it in every matter pertaining thereto; and
(8) to amend and control its process and
orders so as to make them conformable to
law and justice.
It is well-established by this Court that a trial
court must correct an error found by the trial court in
the jury's deliberation and resubmit the matter to the
jury for correction.
(Utah 1963).

Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 383 P.2d 934

This principle was stated by the Court of

Appeals of Oklahoma in Hamilton v. Duffy, 540 P.2d 600
(C.T. App. Okla. 1975) where the court stated:
It is the duty of the trial court to
scrutinize both the form and the
substance of any verdict which is
returned to prevent insufficient or
inconsistent findings from becoming
a part of the record of the Court.
It is normal and proper to ask the
jury to correct a verdict which is
insufficiently formulated, usually by
returning to the jury room to deliberate
further. The court is not bound to accept
a verdict which is not in accordance with
its instructions. Where jurors return a
verdict which is incomplete or ambiguous
the court should direct them to retire
for further deliberations. Id. at 602
(Citations omitted, emphasis added.)
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It is obvious that there is an inconsistency now
created by this Court's majority opinion.

In effect, this

Court has stated that counsel is given the right and
obligation to examine each verdict as it is returned by
the jury. The trial court has no discretion to refuse such
a request since to do so might result in prejudicial error.
The trial court, under the majority opinion, therefore,
cannot on its own initiative return a verdict for further
deliberation without a specific request having been entered
by the counsel for either party.

This is contrary to the

above-cited statutes, rules, and case law which obviously
vest the trial court with considerable discretion in this
regard.
The Johnson v. Simons case cited by the majority
opinion contained a similar problem to the instant case.
Here, it is undisputed that the clerk incorrectly read the
verdict form, thereby failing to alert plaintiff's counsel
to the inconsistency existing.

In Johnson, the trial court,

during a conference, agreed to give a certain instruction
concerning contributory negligence but actually failed to
do so.

Counsel was not given a copy of the instruction

until after the jury had been released.

The dissenting

opinion written by Justices Ellott and Henroid noted the
lack of opportunity of counsel to object to the erroneous
omission of the instruction.

The dissenting opinion

stated:

-4-
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It seems rather obvious that it would be
difficult for counsel, listening to the
reading of the long set of instructions
to recall just what was given, and
'
this would especially be true where the
judge had lulled counsel into a feeling
of security by promising to give the
substance of a particular instruction.
Id. at 518.
In Johnson, even though it was difficult for counsel
to detect the missing instruction, it was still possible
by carefully listening to what was said in open court.
In this case, it was not possible for counsel to detect the
defective verdict without actually seeing it.

Contrary to

the statement of the majority opinion , counsel was not
shown the verdict form at the bench conference with Judge
Banks nor did the judge disclose the verdict's contents.
The majority opinion has created a situation in
which counsel can no longer trust the actions of either
the clerks or the court.

For example, in order

~o

avoid

waiving instructions to the jury counsel can no longer rely
upon the fact that the court claims to submit the same
written instructions to the jury as has been read.

If

the court or the clerk mistakenly submit erroneous instructions to the jury which have not been previously read by
the court, counsel would be deemed to have waived any
objection since counsel did not examine the exact instructions
submitted to the jury but relied upon the representation
of the court that the same instructions would actually be
submitted to the jury room.

Likewise, each time a verdict

is read in the district court it will be incumbent upon
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counsel to demand to see the verdict form regardless of
how simple .·it may be in its reading in order to insure
that the clerk or the court has not mistakenly omitted
or included parts of the verdict form.

Counsel can no

longer accept what the trial court states as the verdict
or what the clerk states as the verdict to rely upon
since, under the majority opinion, even if the court or
the clerk mistakenly or deliberately misreads the verdict
form,

it is counsel, not the court or the court personnel,

which must bear the responsibility for the error.
The burden placed upon counsel in this case is
unreasonable and contrary to the rule requiring the trial
court to also have responsibility for the supervision of the
court personnel and verdict form.

To take an extreme

example, suppose that a trial has developed between a
plaintiff and defendant on the question of negligence.
Special interrogatories are asked, just as in the instant
case, in which the jury answers that the defendant was
negligent, that the negligence of the defendant was not a
proximately cause of the accident, and finds damages in
favor of plaintiff for $20,000.

The trial court sees that

the form is inconsistent since damages are found even
though the defendant is not proximately related to the
accident.

Nevertheless, the court allows the clerk to

read the verdict form.

The clerk misreads the second

answer and declares that the defendant's conduct was a proximate cause of the accident.

Counsel for the defendant has
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nothing to object to since the verdict as read sounds
consistent.

The jury is excused.

The verdict form is

later examined by counsel and an objection is made.

The

trial court overrules the objection by stating that
counsel should have demanded to see the verdict form
before the jury was excused and therefore any erroneous
form is waived.
In this extreme example the lower court completely
failed to supervise its court personnel in the reading
of the verdict and failed to note the inconsistency of
the verdict form.

Nevertheless, under the majority's

opinion the verdict would stand since defense counsel
failed to object to an unobjectionable verdict form as
read.

The instant case is indeed unusual.

i~stance

It is an

where the court clerk omitted to read the very

essence of the verdict form which made it appear inconsistent.

Such an occasion is admittedly rare, but the

principle remains the same.
Utah Rules of

Procedur~

It is contrary to Utah law,

and this Court's prior decisions

to place the burden of erroneous readings of verdicts upon
counsel and not upon the court who, in this case, had
examined the verdict form and knew or should have known

.

that parts of the form had been omitted, when read by
the clerk.
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For this reason, appellant respectfully requests
that a rehearing be granted solely as to the question of
waiver and the burdens imposed upon counsel under the
various aspects of Utah law in order to allow a full
briefing and hearing upon the matters raised herein.
Respectfully submitted this S)..

4:

day of September,

1981.

MAX D. WHEELER

IC\) S:'"" COOK

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
P. O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
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